

"COMMUNIST GUERRILLA WARFARE" 2-②

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FOREWORD

The following discussion of Communist guerrilla warfare takes its lead from principles outlined for that type of war by Communist China's leader, Mao Tse-tung. Mao's guerrilla catechism was tested in action by Chinese Communists in battles against the Japanese and against the Nationalist Chinese forces of Chiang Kai-shek. The Mao concepts were later to be used by Communist Chinese terrorists in Malaya, where the enemy included native Malay forces and specially trained British troops. Communist Viet Minh President Ho Chi Minh and General Vo Nguyen Giap adopted Mao's guerrilla principles to the war for "liberation" from the French in Indochina. Mao's guerrilla doctrines have become the manual for Communist guerrilla action in the Far East. Since Communist guerrilla moves are always a possibility in future Communist aggression in the area, antiguerrilla tactics must evolve from efforts to meet the type of guerrilla action Mao prescribes and that Communist forces are known to use.

British and French forces developed military tactics to meet guerrilla situations. The British succeeded, and the French failed, though admittedly in a more difficult set of circumstances. Much can be learned from both experiences, and this study goes into the strategy of both nations.

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'No one will think of taking over the leadership in a war without knowing its laws. But in addition to the traditional type of war there exists the revolutionary war, which has its own characteristics, its own laws. He who is not familiar with them has not the slightest chance to carry away the victory in such a war.'

Mao Tse-tung

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DEFINITIONS

These Terms Have the Following Specialized
Meanings in This Study

DISSIDENT: One of a group in disagreement with the established order. The differences usually result in passive acts rather than individual or organized collective violence.

REBEL: An individual who is plotting to or is actually resisting the established order by force. The aim is to overthrow the established order, and to accomplish this the rebel may resort to terrorist or guerrilla activities.

INSURGENT: A member of a group engaged in an uprising against the established order, where the revolt has not yet reached the stage of a revolutionary government nor a belligerency.

GUERRILLA: A combatant member of an organized or partially organized militant force, the functions of which include harassing, delaying or disruptive action against the enemy, and the destruction of an enemy either by independent small unit action or coordinated action with the regular force.

TERRORIST: One who uses intimidation or violence or both to demoralize either the civilian populace or the military forces or both as a means of opposing or disrupting the established order with the aim of assisting in seizure and subsequent control of an area.

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COMMUNIST CONCEPTS FOR REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Mao Tse-tung developed the following strategic uses for guerrilla warfare and adhered to them when he led guerrilla forces against the Japanese during World War II in China and against Chiang Kai-shek before and after World War II. Ho Chi Minh, from 1948 to 1954 in the war against the French in Indochina, followed these principles. Communists will doubtlessly continue to follow them in any expansion of their aggression in Southeast Asia or elsewhere in the Far East. Mao stated that the following six principles constituted his strategic program during the entire guerrilla war against the Japanese and that these principles serve as the necessary means for preserving and expanding our (Communist) forces, annihilating or ousting the enemy, and coordinating with regular warfare to win final victory.

Six Principles of Guerrilla Warfare -- Mao Tse-tung

1. *On our own initiative, with flexibility and according to our own plan, carry out offensives in a defensive war, battles of quick decision in a protracted war, and exterior line operations within interior line operation.*
2. *Coordination with regular warfare.*
3. *The establishment of base areas.*
4. *Strategic defensive and strategic offensive in guerrilla warfare.*
5. *Development into mobile warfare.*
6. *Relationship of commands.*

Mao's discussion of these principles follows.

FIRST PRINCIPLE: On our own initiative, with flexibility and according to our own plan, carry out offensives in a defensive war, battles of quick decision in a protracted war, and exterior line operations within interior line operation.

It is possible and necessary to make, in a strategically defensive war, offensives in campaigns and battles; to wage campaigns and battles of quick decision in a strategically protracted war; and to wage campaigns and battles on the exterior line within the strategic interior line.

Offensives in guerrilla warfare generally take the form of surprise attacks, while in regular warfare, although surprise attacks should and can be adopted, relatively few opportunities arise whereby the enemy can be caught unprepared.

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In guerrilla operations, concentration of the biggest possible force, secret and swift actions, surprise attacks on the enemy, and quick decisions in battles are required. Passive defense, procrastination, and dispersion of forces immediately before combat must be carefully avoided.

Although there is strategical and tactical defense to inflict attrition on the enemy and to wear him out, the basic principle of guerrilla warfare must be one of offense and its offensive character must be more pronounced than that of regular warfare. Further, such offensives must take the form of surprise attacks. Display and showiness are even more impermissible in guerrilla warfare than in regular warfare.

Although on occasion, guerrilla battles may continue for several days, as in a battle against a small, isolated, and helpless enemy force; in general, quick battle decisions are vital to successful guerrilla warfare.

Because of its dispersed nature, guerrilla warfare can be spread wide, and the principle of dividing up the forces applies in many of its tasks, such as in harassing, containing, and disrupting the enemy, and in mass work; but when a guerrilla detachment or corps is performing the tasks of annihilating the enemy, particularly when it is striving to smash an enemy offensive, its main force must be concentrated. "Gather a big force to strike at a small enemy segment," remains one of the guidelines for field operations in guerrilla warfare.

We must concentrate a preponderant force in every battle and adopt, whether in the period of strategic defense or in the period of strategic counteroffensive, exterior line operations in every campaign or battle to encircle and annihilate the enemy. We must encircle a part of the enemy, if not the whole, annihilate a part of the encircled, if not the whole, and inflict heavy casualties upon them, if not capture them.

Initiative: Initiative for an army means choice of action. Any army that loses its initiative will be forced into a passive position, be deprived of its freedom of action, and will run the risk of being exterminated or defeated. To obtain the initiative is more difficult in strategic defensive and interior line operations and easier in offensive exterior line operations.

Initiative is vital to guerrilla warfare, for a guerrilla unit usually finds itself in grave circumstances: the absence of a rear for its operations, its own weak force pitted against the enemy's strong force, and in the case of a newly organized guerrilla unit, its lack of experience and of unity. Nevertheless, we can gain the initiative in guerrilla warfare, the essential condition being the utilization of the enemy's defects.

The initiative results from a correct estimation of the situation (of both the enemy's and ours), as well as correct military and political dispositions. Pessimistic estimations at a variance with objective conditions and the passive dispositions which they entail will undoubtedly deprive one of the initiative and throw him into a passive position. Similarly, over-optimistic estimations at variance with objective conditions and the

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venturesome dispositions (an uncalled for venturesomeness) which they entail will also deprive one of the initiative and eventually lead him to the same path as do pessimistic estimations.

The initiative is not the natural gift of a genius, but something achieved by an intelligent leader who studies with a receptive mind and makes correct estimations of objective conditions and correct military and political dispositions. Therefore, it is something to be consciously striven for, not something ready made.

A guerrilla unit should carry out the tasks of extricating itself from a passive position when forced into one through some incorrect estimation and disposition or some overwhelming pressure. Circumstances are often such as to make it necessary to run away. Running away is the chief means of getting out of passivity and regaining the initiative, but not the only means. Frequently the initiative and an advantageous position are gained through one's effort at holding out a bit longer.

Flexibility: Flexible employment of forces is the most important means of changing the situation between the enemy and ourselves and gaining the initiative. Guerrilla forces must be flexibly employed according to conditions such as the task, the enemy disposition, the terrain, and the inhabitants. The chief ways of employing the forces consist of dispersing, concentrating, and shifting them. When guerrilla forces are dispersed we must not incur losses through an ignorance of the situation and mistakes in actions. In employing the forces it is necessary to maintain liaison and communication and to keep an adequate portion of the main force on hand. Guerrillas should constantly shift their positions.

Generally speaking, the dispersion of guerrilla forces is employed mainly in the following circumstances:

1. When we threaten the enemy with a wide frontal attack because he is on the defensive, and we are still unable to mass our forces to engage him.
2. When we widely harass and disrupt the enemy in an area where his forces are weak.
3. When unable to break through the enemy's encirclement, we try to divert his attention in order to get away from him.
4. When we are restricted by the condition of terrain or in matters of supply.
5. When we carry on work among the people over a vast area.

In dispersed actions under any circumstances, attention should be paid to the following:

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1. No absolutely even dispersion of forces should be made. A larger part of the forces should be kept at a place conveniently situated for its flexible employment so that, on the one hand, any possible exigency can be readily met and, on the other, the dispersed units can be used to fulfill the main task.

2. The dispersed units should be assigned clearly defined tasks, fields of operation, specific time limits and rendezvous, and ways and means of liaison.

Concentration: Forces are concentrated largely for the annihilation of an enemy on the offensive but sometimes for the annihilation of certain stationary forces when the enemy is on the defensive.

Concentration of forces does not mean absolute concentration, but the massing of the main forces in a certain important direction while retaining or dispatching a part of the forces in other directions for containing, harassing, or disrupting the enemy, or for work among the people.

Shifting of forces: Although flexible dispersion or concentration of forces is the principal method in guerrilla warfare, we must also know how to shift our forces flexibly.

When the enemy feels seriously threatened by the guerrillas he will send troops to suppress or attack them. Guerrilla leaders should ponder the situation and:

1. If possible fight on the spot.
2. If not possible to fight, shift rapidly to another position.

Sometimes the guerrilla units for the purpose of smashing the enemy units separately may, after annihilating an enemy force in one place, shift immediately to another to wipe out another enemy force.

Guerrillas, finding it inadvisable to fight in one place, may sometimes have to disengage immediately from the enemy at that position and engage him elsewhere.

If the enemy's forces at one position are particularly strong, the guerrilla units should not engage him there for long, but should shift their positions as speedily as possible. In general, the shifting of forces should be done secretly and swiftly. Ingenious devices such as making a noise in the east while attacking in the west, appearing now in the south and then in the north, and hit-and-run, and night action should be constantly employed to mislead, entice, and confuse the enemy.

Planning: Without planning it is impossible to win a guerrilla war. The idea of fighting a haphazard guerrilla war means nothing but making a game out of it, the idea of an ignoramus.

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Operations within a guerrilla area must be preceded by the most comprehensive planning possible. Guerrilla leaders must consider how to grasp the initiative, define the tasks, dispose the forces to carry out military and political training, procure supplies, make arrangements for equipment, and how to secure the help of the people. These steps should all be carefully worked out by the leader and rechecked. Without this there could be no initiative, flexibility, or offensive. The conditions of guerrilla warfare do not permit so high a degree of planning as in regular warfare; consequently, to attempt highly comprehensive planning in guerrilla warfare is a mistake, but it is still necessary so far as objective conditions permit to make plans as comprehensive as possible.

The initiative can be gained only after success has been scored in an offensive. All offensives must be organized on our own initiative and not launched under compulsion. The flexible employment of forces centers around the endeavor to take the offensive; likewise, planning is necessary chiefly for victories in offensives. Tactical defensive measures become meaningless when divorced from their roles of supporting an offensive directly or indirectly. Quick decision refers to the tempo of an offensive, and by the exterior line is meant the scope of the offensive. The offensive is the only means of annihilating the enemy as well as the principal means of preserving oneself; pure defense and withdrawal can play only a temporary and partial role in preserving oneself and are utterly useless in annihilating the enemy.

SECOND PRINCIPLE: Coordination with regular warfare.

There are three kinds of coordination between guerrilla warfare and regular warfare: in strategy, campaigns, and in battles.

Strategy: The roles played by guerrilla units behind the enemy's rear, i.e., crippling and containing the enemy, disrupting his supply line, and raising the morale of both the regular army and the people, all point to the need for strategic coordination with the regular army. In coordinating with the regular army, the guerrillas will play a strategic defensive role when the enemy is launching a strategic offensive; will handicap the enemy defense when the enemy concludes his strategic offensive and turns to defend the areas he has occupied; and will also repulse the enemy forces and recover all lost territories when the regular army launches a strategic counteroffensive.

Campaigns: When participating in a campaign, the leader of each guerrilla base in the enemy's rear should properly dispose his forces and adopt different tactics according to prevailing local conditions. So that he may succeed in crippling and containing the enemy, he should take positive action against the enemy's most vital and vulnerable points, disrupting his transport and raising the morale of our own armies engaged in interior line campaigns. By so doing the guerrilla leader thus will fulfill his responsibility of campaign coordination. To attain the end of coordination in campaigns it is absolutely necessary to equip all larger guerrilla units with radio equipment.

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Battles: Coordination of battle actions is the task of all guerrilla units in the neighborhood of the battlefield on the interior line. In each case the guerrilla units should take up the tasks assigned by the commander of the regular force, usually tasks to contain part of the enemy, disrupt his transport, spy on him, and act as guides. Without any direction from the commander of the regular force, the guerrilla units should carry out such tasks voluntarily. There must be no sitting back and watching, or moving about without fighting.

THIRD PRINCIPLE: The establishment of base areas.

Base areas are the strategic bases on which a guerrilla unit relies for carrying out its strategic tasks as well as for achieving the goals of preserving and expanding the unit and annihilating or expelling the enemy.

Without such bases there would be nothing to depend on for carrying out all the strategic tasks and fulfilling all the war objectives. Operating without a rear area is a characteristic of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy line, for it is detached from the nation's general rear. Guerrilla war could not be maintained and developed for long without base areas which are indeed its rear.

Types of base areas: Bases are mainly of three types: those in the mountains, those in the plains, and those in the river-lake estuary regions.

We must develop guerrilla warfare and set up base areas in all mountain regions behind the enemy lines. Mountain base areas are places where guerrilla warfare can hold out for the longest time. Plains are inferior to mountains, but one must not rule out the possibility of developing guerrilla warfare or establishing some sort of base area on the plains. The establishment of base areas that can hold out for a long time is not confined, but the establishment of temporary base areas has been proved possible and that of base areas for small units or for seasonal use ought to be possible.

The possibility of developing guerrilla warfare and establishing base areas in the river-lake estuary regions is greater than on the plains, but less so than in the mountain regions.

Conditions for establishment of base areas: The basic condition for the establishment of base areas is that there should be an armed force employed to defeat the enemy and to arouse the people into action. Leaders in guerrilla war must exert their utmost to build up one or several guerrilla units and in the course of the struggle must develop them gradually into guerrilla corps and eventually into regular units and regular corps. Without an armed force or with one that is not strong enough, nothing can be done.

The armed forces must be employed in coordination with the masses of the people to defeat the enemy. If we do not repulse the enemy's attacks and defeat him, those regions under our control will become enemy controlled, and then the establishment of base areas will become impossible.

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All power should be employed to arouse the people to struggle against the enemy. We must arm the people, organize self-defense corps and guerrilla units. We must form mass organizations. Workers, peasants, youths, women, children, merchants, and members of the free professions, according to their political consciousness and fighting enthusiasm, should be organized into the various indispensable public bodies which are to expand gradually. We must eliminate the collaborators in the open or under cover, a task that we can accomplish only by relying on the people. We must arouse the people to establish or consolidate the local organs of enemy political power. Where the original organs of political power have not been destroyed by the enemy, we must, on the basis of the support of the masses, proceed to reform and consolidate them. Where destroyed by the enemy, we must rebuild them.

Consolidation and expansion of base areas: If we only attend to expansion and forget consolidation in guerrilla warfare, we not only lose territory gained but the very existence of vast areas is endangered. Conservation due to love of comfort or an incorrect estimation of the enemy's strength can only bring losses and harm guerrilla war.

The correct principle is expansion through consolidation. Choose a base area where we can be on the defense or offense as we choose.

As tasks of expansion and consolidation are different in nature, military dispositions and the execution of our tasks will differ accordingly. To shift the emphasis from one to the other according to the time and the circumstances is the only way to solve the problems properly.

Guerrilla areas as opposed to base areas: In guerrilla war conducted in the enemy's rear, guerrilla areas are distinguished from guerrilla base areas.

Guerrilla areas: Areas which the guerrillas can not completely occupy but can only constantly harass and attack, which are recovered by the guerrillas only when they arrive and are lost to the puppet regime as soon as they leave and which consequently are not yet guerrilla base areas but are only guerrilla areas. Guerrilla areas will be transformed into base areas when they have gone through the necessary processes of guerrilla war; that is, when a large number of enemy troops have been annihilated or defeated, the puppet regime destroyed, the activity of the people called forth, the people's government formed, and the people's armed forces developed. To develop a guerrilla area into a base area is therefore a painstaking process. Whether a guerrilla area has been transformed into a base area depends on the extent to which the enemy is annihilated and the masses of the people are aroused.

As a result of our erroneous leadership or the enemy's strong pressure, the guerrilla base area may change into a guerrilla area and a guerrilla area may become an area under the relatively stabilized occupation of the enemy. This may occur sometimes and deserves the vigilant attention of the leaders of guerrilla war.

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As a result of guerrilla warfare and the struggle between the enemy and ourselves, any of the enemy occupied territories falls into one of the following three categories: (1) areas controlled by our guerrilla forces and our organs of political power, (2) areas in the grip of the enemy and the puppet regime, and (3) areas contested by both sides or guerrilla areas.

FOURTH PRINCIPLE: Strategic defensive and strategic offensive in guerrilla warfare.

After a guerrilla war has been started and considerably developed, especially when the enemy has ceased his strategic offensive against us on a nationwide scale and has adopted instead a policy of defending the areas under his occupation, he will inevitably attack the guerrilla base areas. It is essential to recognize this inevitability for otherwise the leaders in a guerrilla war will be caught unprepared, will certainly fall into panic and confusion, and will be routed by the enemy.

To eliminate the guerrillas and their base areas, the enemy will resort to converging attacks. When the enemy is launching a converging attack in several columns each consisting of only a single unit, big or small, without reinforcements, and if he is unable to man the route of advance, we should then construct fortifications, or build motor roads. In our dispositions we should contain a number of enemy columns with our supplementary forces and use our main force to attack a single enemy column by springing a surprise attack on it in campaigns and battles (mainly ambushes) and striking at it while it is on the move. The enemy weakened by our repeated surprise attacks will often withdraw halfway. By then the guerrillas may spring more surprise attacks during their pursuit of the enemy so as to weaken him further. We should encircle the town or towns which the enemy occupied before he stops his offensive or begins to withdraw, cutting off his food supply and communications. When he fails to hold out we should pursue and attack him. After smashing one column, we should shift our forces to smash another, thereby shattering separately the enemy's columns taking part in the converging attack.

In an operational plan for coping with a converging attack, our main forces are generally placed on the interior line. In the case when we are superior in strength, it is necessary to use supplementary forces such as county or district guerrilla units and sometimes even detachments from the main forces on the exterior line to disrupt the enemy's communication lines and to contain his reinforcements.

In the case when the enemy remains for a long time in our base area, we may reverse the scheme, that is, leave a part of our forces in the base area to besiege the enemy while employing the main forces to attack the region whence the enemy came and to intensify our activities there, so that the enemy long stationed in our base area may be enticed to come out and engage us.

During retreat the enemy often sets fire to the houses in the villages and towns he has occupied and in the villages along his route, with the

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purpose of destroying the base areas for guerrilla warfare. In so doing he is depriving himself of shelter and food in his next offensive, and the damage will recoil upon himself.

A leader in a guerrilla war should not think of abandoning his present base area and shifting to another unless many attempts have been made to smash the enemy's converging attacks, and it is conclusively shown that they cannot be smashed there. In such an event he must carefully guard against pessimism. So long as the leader commits no blunder in principle, it is generally possible for the guerrillas to smash the enemy's converging attacks and to hold on to the bases in mountainous areas. It is only on the plains that the guerrilla leader, confronted with a vigorous converging attack, should consider temporarily shifting the main guerrilla corps to some mountainous region. If a shift is made, numerous small units should be left to operate in dispersion, thereby facilitating the return of the main corps when the main forces of the enemy move away.

After we have smashed the enemy's offensive and before his new offensive starts, the enemy is on the strategic defensive and we are on the strategic offensive. At this time, our operational direction lies not in attacking enemy forces holding stoutly to their defensive positions, which we may not be able to defeat, but in annihilating or expelling small enemy units and puppet forces which our guerrilla units are strong enough to attack. In expanding the areas under our occupation, we must annihilate small enemy units and arouse the people into action.

The difficult problems of provisions, of bedding and clothing are usually also tackled at this time. It is necessary to give the troops rest and training, and the best time for this is when the enemy is on the defensive.

During the strategic offensive, the leaders in the guerrilla war should not be so elated with success as to underrate the enemy and forget to strengthen internal solidarity and consolidate the base areas and the troops. They should watch carefully every move of the enemy and see if there is any sign of an offensive against us, so that the moment it comes we can properly bring our strategic offensive to close, turn to the strategic defensive, and smash the enemy's offensive.

FIFTH PRINCIPLE: Development into mobile warfare.

It is necessary for guerrilla units to change gradually into regular armies in a protracted war. The development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare does not mean the abandonment of guerrilla warfare but the gradual formation in the midst of an extensively developed guerrilla warfare of a main force capable of conducting a mobile war, round which there should still be numerous guerrilla forces carrying on extensive guerrilla operations.

To raise the quality of the guerrilla units we must improve them politically and organizationally. We must improve their equipment, military training, and their tactics and discipline, gradually remolding them on the pattern of the regular army.

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Organizationally it is imperative to establish step by step such military and political setups as are required in the regular corps. All regular armies have the responsibility of assisting the guerrilla units in their development into regular armed units.


SIXTH PRINCIPLE: Relationship of commands.

Guerrilla units are armed bodies on a lower level than a regular army and are characterized by dispersed operations. The high degree of centralization in directing regular warfare is not permitted in directing guerrilla warfare. A highly centralized command is opposed to the high degree of elasticity of guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare, however, cannot be developed steadily if centralized command is done away with altogether. When extensive regular and guerrilla warfare go on at the same time, it is essential to coordinate the operations of both by unified command.

The principle of command in a guerrilla war demands a centralized command in strategy and a decentralized command in campaigns and battles. Centralized strategic command includes: planning and direction of the entire guerrilla war by the state; coordination between guerrilla and regular war in each zone; and unified direction of all the armed forces in each guerrilla area or base area.

If centralization is not effected where it should be, it would mean a neglect of duty on the part of the higher echelon and usurpation of power on the part of the lower ranks—neither is permissible in the relationship between the higher and lower bodies, especially in military matters.

If decentralization is not effected where it should be, it is monopoly of power on the part of the higher echelon and lack of initiative on the part of the lower ranks—neither is permissible in the relationship between the higher and lower bodies, especially in the command in a guerrilla war. Such a principle is the only correct directive for solving the problem.



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OPERATIONS IN MALAYA

COMMUNIST FORCES

The Communist movement in Malaya is unlike the Communist movements in other Southeast Asian countries in that it is not indigenous, nor did it develop from the grievances of a down-trodden peasantry, an oppressed laboring class, or from any frustrated desire for national independence. Communism in Malaya results from the direct introduction of the Communist virus into a small vein of the Chinese community by the Communist Party in China.

In the immediate postwar period the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) functioned as a legally recognized political party and devoted its attention to gaining control of the new trade union movement, organizing youth groups, and infiltrating various political organizations. These relatively peaceful tactics changed abruptly in early 1948 after two international Communist conferences in Calcutta, where Moscow ordered the MCP and other Asian Communist parties to instigate a program of violence that would lead to armed revolt.

The MCP soon instituted a campaign of indiscriminate terrorism and mass strikes that caused painful unrest in Malaya and Singapore. To cope with the alarming situation, the British imposed emergency regulations in Jun 48 and outlawed the MCP and its affiliates one month later. By then, most leading MCP personnel had vanished into the dense jungle that covers four-fifths of the country. Underground Communists organized themselves into the Malayan People's Anti-British Army, which later became the Malayan Race's Liberation Army (MRLA).

When they entered the jungle, the Communists had an estimated force of between 3,000 and 4,000 guerrillas. By recruitment and intimidation, they were able to field, during the height of their terrorism and up to 1951, a maximum force of 8,000 to 9,000 fanatics. Between 1948 and 1951, the Communists were able to replace casualties with new recruits. It is estimated that the guerrilla war—still going on—has resulted in at least 11,000 Communist casualties. The Red insurgents have killed about 4,300 security forces troops and civilians and have wounded an almost equal number.

MRLA recruitment in recent years has been negligible, but the estimated 700 terrorists still in the jungle are hard core terrorists who work under tight discipline in small units. They have hideouts throughout the Federation of Malaya, but the largest concentrations are in the extreme southern state of Johore and the northwestern states of Kedah and Perak, both of which border on Thailand.

To combat the Communists, the Malayan Government has had to maintain a fairly large force of about 150,000 troops, including British, Australian, New Zealand, Gurkha, and Malayan elements. Fighting the Red guerrillas has also been costly. In 1956 alone, expenditures for defense and internal security amounted to \$70 million.

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Malayan Communist Military and Political Organization: Communist parties in Russia and China guide MCP policy. The aim has always been to establish a Communist People's Republic in Malaya by overthrowing the lawful government. Though this objective has never changed since the MCP was created in 1927, the plan to achieve it has altered frequently. Every aspect of the political and economic life of the country has been watched and, where expedient, has been exploited to further Communist Party aims.

The MCP is organized on orthodox Communist Party lines. The Central Executive Committee is composed of some 12 ranking MCP executives under the Secretary General's direction. This committee rarely assembles, and actual policy direction emanates from a Politbureau consisting of three or four members including the Secretary General. The Politbureau determines overall policy in the name of the Central Committee. The Politbureau is responsible for liaison with the Communist Party outside Malaya, controls MRLA, and directs the propaganda of the Party Education and Propaganda Committee.

The Military High Command is believed to exist in name only. It is probably the title assumed by the Central Committee when it issues directives to the Armed Forces.

State and Regional Committees: Although operational control normally exists at the State Committee level there are cases where, because of geographic reasons, control in large states has been split between two Regional Committees. State and Regional Committees are, in fact, combined political and military commands and issue directives on broad policy matters in the name of the Regimental Headquarters.


Each State and Regional Committee directs a number of District Committees. The number of districts varies from about four to seven according to the size and geography of each state and region. The district is the main functional level of the MCP.

Branch Committees work under the direction of District Committees. Each District Committee supervises about four Branch Committees. The Branch Committees control units known as Armed Work Forces. The rank and file of these units are the link between the Terrorist Organization in the jungle and their supporters living in the open.

The Min Yuen Movement: The Min Yuen Movement is controlled by District and Branch Committees, which spearhead MCP political organization and are in direct contact with the masses. Local Min Yuen organizations are called by many names: Workers Protection Corps, People's Defense Corps, Peasant Union, and so on. In spite of the variety of names, the general functions of these organizations are similar and include the collection of funds for the operation of the MRLA, provision of supplies and intelligence information, dissemination of propaganda, provision of recruits for the party and the MRLA, sabotage and participation in guerrilla warfare. Little is known about Min Yuen's inner organization other than that its leadership is very tightly knit and consists of trusted Communists who maintain effective independent liaison with MCP and MRLA units operating in their home areas.

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MALAYAN COMMUNIST
MILITARY AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION



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Following a decision by the Central Committee in Jun 49, District Committees organized and controlled their own armed units to back up Communist civil activities. Min Yuen executives have invariably led these units. The Min Yuen activists are trusted Communists who have been given some military training and are empowered to form their own commands. These commands are established to protect the political organization in the area by conducting terrorist activities as needed to support either the MRLA or other factions of the Min Yuen.

The Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA): The MCP's full time military organization is MRLA, which carries out the military tasks of the MCP. It was originally organized in regiments, but due to logistic difficulties these were disbanded though their headquarters still exist in name. MRLA now consists entirely of independent platoons, some of which are employed on bodyguard duties and other Min Yuen activities.

At the beginning of the emergency, MRLA strength was estimated at between 4,000 and 5,000. Min Yuen's strength has never been accurately established, but estimates both by the armed forces and the Malay police have put it at between 15,000 and 25,000 during various stages of the conflict.

The MCP's Central Executive Committee (CEC) exercised control over the MRLA, but since CEC lacked communications and had no fixed location, actual control was limited to issuing policy directives and general instructions. These were passed on to the regional bureaus which in turn disseminated them to the State and Regional Committees. Regional Committees were organized into various functional departments, the most important being the Organization and Propaganda Department. In theory, each State or Regional Committee controlled one MRLA regiment, each of which contained three battalions organized triangularly down to platoon level. In practice considerable variation in the composition and strength of the various regiments has existed. None of the regiments developed fully.

MCP's strategic policy was laid down by its Central Committee in the Kerdau Document, which states that in order to achieve victory the Communist campaign was to be carried out in three phases. Only in the third phase would guerrilla warfare become a conventional war of movement. The phases are:

One -- Guerrilla warfare is envisaged from Malaya-wide temporary bases. During this phase enemy strength will be worn down. At the same time, the MRLA will be built up and all its forces will be battle tested. The Min Yuen will also be expanded, and the MCP's civil strength will be increased.

Two -- During this phase actions begun in Phase One will be intensified. Communist forces will undergo a further expansion and will occupy enemy bases in smaller villages and towns throughout the Federation.

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Three -- Min Yuen's gradual assumption of administrative control of areas abandoned by the enemy is envisioned. This would allow large concentrations of Communist forces and the establishment of permanent bases. At this time, warfare will pass from the guerrilla phase to the war of movement. Guerrilla forces will then be converted into a regular army.

Communist leaders apparently have not set a timetable for advancing through the stages of their strategic policy. They have realized that wide popular support must be obtained before the achievement of ultimate victory. The gaining of such support from Malaya's diversified races has proved a major problem. Communist strategy called for the correct treatment of the masses so that the masses would cooperate with guerrilla forces. When certain elements of the masses did not respond to this treatment, terror would be used to compel cooperation.

Communist Tactics in Malaya: Communist guerrilla tactics were those best suited to the jungle, which covers four-fifths of Malaya. The MRLA was



BRITISH PATROL CAPTURES GUERRILLA

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characterized by the lack of permanent bases from which to operate. Its operations were launched from temporary bases close to its targets. Since the MRLA relied on its civilian organization, the Min Yuen, for supplies and intelligence, mobility was increased. As a result, MRLA was able to maintain the initiative against base-bound, government security forces.

Basic units of the MRLA are the company and the platoon. To them is allotted the mission of attacking the hard targets such as the federation security forces, police stations, and guarded estates.

The armed members of the Min Yuen attack minor targets and commit sabotage. As the occasion demands, armed Min Yuen personnel will join MRLA units for specific operations.

In practice, guerrillas attack only when their forces are superior. In addition, they depend on surprise coupled with hit-and-run tactics to assure victory.

Since the Communists have no facilities for the production of arms, ammunition, or equipment, they emphasize the use of captured items. To supplement supplies of ammunition, Communist armorers have resorted to ingenious methods of refilling used cartridge cases.

Tactical Principles: Tactical principles taught by the MRLA were those used successfully by Chinese Communist guerrilla units during World War II in China. These principles include the following:

- a. Refuse to enter an engagement unless there are strong indications that the outcome will be favorable.
- b. Use the element of surprise.
- c. Do not be drawn into conventional warfare. It favors the enemy's superior armament, training, and manpower.
- d. Intelligence on the enemy must be detailed, complete, and timely.
- e. Before entering an engagement prepare a detailed plan which takes into consideration all phases of the operation including withdrawal.
- f. Practice camouflage.
- g. Risk engagements with security forces only when guerrilla forces exceed enemy strength.
- h. Attack aggressively, use initiative.
- i. Practice deception; never let the enemy know where your main effort will be made.
- j. Familiarize yourself with enemy weapons so as to be able to use captured arms immediately.

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k. Practice dispersion; it will prevent the enemy from defeating the main guerrilla force and at the same time will force him to employ more troops to defend vital areas.

1. Constantly seek to improve tactics and techniques.

m. Harass the enemy constantly.

Types of Guerrilla Operations: The MRLA uses several different types of operations. They consider the ambush and the raid the most important, but they use the surprise attack and sabotage most frequently.

The Ambush: The MRLA attaches great importance to the technique of ambush, an operation MRLA utilized whenever possible. The chief purpose of the ambush appears to be the seizure of arms and equipment. On other occasions the ambush is used to embarrass the government, to lower civilian morale, or to eliminate government officials, estate managers, and other people who are cooperating with the government.

Whatever the motive for the ambush, always present are the elements of surprise, detailed planning to include concealment, well-located firing positions, and a means of rapid withdrawal.

The MRLA constantly seeks to improve its ambush tactics. This is evident from a captured MRLA document summarizing the good points, defects, and lessons learned from ambushes accomplished. Good points observed were:

1. Proper selection of the ambush site.
2. Good firing positions.
3. Courage in the assaults.
4. Ability to wait long periods in position in order to carry out the ambush.

Defects noted were:

1. Attempts to seize arms and equipment before the enemy is eliminated.
2. Failure to place the proper reliance on covering fire.
3. Inability to use weapons captured.
4. Failure to use cover in the assault phase.

Lessons learned from past ambushes were:

1. Casualties can be lessened by delaying the assault until opposition has been reduced by casualties.

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2. Armored vehicles need not be feared if the ambushing unit is well dug in.

3. When ambushing a patrol consisting of a jeep and an armored vehicle, one section of the attacking unit is required to prevent the armored vehicle from assisting the jeep. The assault must be resolute, but sources of active resistance must first be located.

The ambush of 6 Oct 51 in which High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya Sir Henry Gurney was killed is a classic example of the care and detailed planning involved in this type of operation. Tactical surprise, complete intelligence, and careful selection of the ambush site were exploited by the MRLA with the result that Sir Henry was killed and seven police constables were wounded. There were no known MRLA casualties.


The guerrillas apparently arrived in the area on 4 Oct, two days before the ambush. Firing positions were selected high above the road and well sited to give both enfilading and flanking fire on all sections of the ambush position where there were numerous large rocks. The ambush extended over about 400 yards of narrow winding road, which any passing vehicle would be forced to negotiate at reduced speed. Charging sections were organized and stationed so as to be in position to assault any vehicle stopped within the position.

Whether the guerrillas knew of the impending visit of the High Commissioner is unknown; however, shortly after occupying the position, guerrilla intelligence apparently notified the unit of the impending visit of the High Commissioner to Frasers Hill and that he might pass the ambush area. Thereupon numerous vehicles that would have been profitable targets were allowed to pass through the ambush positions unmolested. The guerrillas kept a detailed log of the time of arrival, description of vehicles, and personnel or supplies carried. Notations in the log covered a 36-hour period. The High Commissioner's party consisting of four vehicles passed through Kuala Kuba Bahru without incident. Just north of the village one vehicle, a radio truck carrying six policemen, broke down and was left behind. The rest of the party traveled another six miles and entered the ambush area. Guerrilla fire was directed initially at the lead vehicle and the second vehicle. No effective fire was returned until the third vehicle, an armored scout-car, arrived and engaged the guerrillas with its Bren gun. At the sound of a bugle, the guerrilla firing ceased, and the guerrillas withdrew.

The Raid: This type of operation has not been used as extensively as the ambush. The main purpose of the guerrilla raid is to annihilate small security detachments. Benefits to MRLA from such raids are the capture of arms and equipment, economic damage to installations, and a lowering of civilian morale, which in turn makes the masses more vulnerable to Communist intimidations.

As in the case of the ambush, guerrillas depend upon surprise and detailed planning to insure victory in the raid. As a basis for accurate

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planning, they insist on complete and detailed intelligence. Detailed reconnaissance of the target area prior to the attack is stressed. This is accomplished sometimes by a guerrilla disguised as a rubber tapper or by a Min Yuen member living in the area. A detailed report to include a sketch map is submitted after the reconnaissance. A captured guerrilla document shows the detailed type of sketch map guerrillas are instructed to obtain prior to attacking a target.

The Surprise Attack: This type of operation is particularly annoying to Federation Security Forces. It usually involves only one or two guerrillas who fire at passing trains or at home guards as they open resettlement area gates.

Sabotage: The main purpose of sabotage is the destruction of the economy of a country. A secondary consideration is the embarrassment of the Security Forces in the eyes of the civilian population. Since this type of operation is frequently carried out and usually affects the common man in one way or another in his attempt to earn a living, each act lowers popular faith in the Government's ability to protect life and property.

ANTI-COMMUNIST FORCES

Government Program: At the end of World War II, some colonial powers realized it was impossible to hold their colonies indefinitely. Great Britain gave independence to Burma and India, and created Pakistan shortly after the war. In Malaya, nationalism threatened to aid the Communist insurgents materially by uniting all elements in an anti-British crusade. Recognizing this danger and realizing that immediate withdrawal would create a political vacuum into which the Communists could move, Britain decided that an immediate pullout was unwise. The Federation of Malaya agreement was proposed. It provided for a degree of self-government, Malayan citizenship for all who acknowledged Malaya as their permanent home, and restoration of considerable power to state rulers. The agreement was signed on 21 Jan 48 and became effective one month later.


A few weeks after the signing of the agreement, the Communists began a campaign of indiscriminate terrorism, which included murder, arson, extortion, and intimidation. To protect the country from this virtual siege, the Federation Government declared an emergency in Jun 48, and in July the Government outlawed the MCP.

The responsibility for conducting the anti-guerrilla campaign in Malaya rests with the civil government. The Government's normal instrument for the maintenance of civil authority is the police, but in the current emergency the armed forces have been called in to support the civil power in seeking out and destroying armed Communist terrorism. In addition, a home guard has been formed.

Since nearly every function of government is affected by the emergency, a special system of control of operations was established to provide intimate cooperation at all levels between departments of government and the security forces.

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THE MALAYAN RACES LIBERATION ARMY (MRLA) TRIES TO OBTAIN EXTREMELY DETAILED INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL TARGETS. THE DRAWING ABOVE, COPIED FROM A CAPTURED GUERRILLA DOCUMENT, SHOWS A SCHEMATIC LAYOUT OF A RUBBER ESTATE AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION DESIRED BY THE MRLA.

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Emergency Operations Council (EOC): This committee is responsible to the Government of the Federation of Malaya for the overall conduct of the campaign and for ensuring full integration of civil government and security force measures. EOC comprises: the Prime Minister (Chairman), Ministers of Defense, Finance, Health, Interior, Agriculture, Labor and Commerce, the Federal Director of Emergency Operations, the General Officer commanding the Federation Army, Secretary of Defense, Commissioner of Police, the Flag Officer Malayan area, the General Officer commanding Overseas Commonwealth Land Forces, and the Air Officer commanding RAF in Malaya. The Federal Director of Operations is responsible for the day-to-day conduct of emergency operations. He is not in command of any security forces but exercises operational direction and control of forces assigned for operations against Communist terrorists through respective security force commanders. If appropriate, he issues instructions to State War Executive Committees.

Commanders Subcommittee: This group makes policy on the use of security forces within the overall plan approved by EOC. This committee includes: the General Officer commanding the Federation Army, Police Commissioner, Flag Officer Malayan area, Federal Officer commanding Overseas Commonwealth Land Forces, and the Air Officer commanding the RAF in Malaya. The EOC Director is the chairman of the Commanders Subcommittee. To assist him, especially in implementing EOC and Commanders Subcommittee decisions, there is a small joint staff headed by the principal staff officer.

State Warfare Executive Committees: In each Malayan state a State War Executive Committee exists that is responsible for waging the "war" in the state. The committee consists of: the Chief Minister, the State Secretary, Chief Police Officer, Senior Military Commander, State Home Guard officer, the Executive Secretary, and other selected community leaders.

District War Executive Committees: In almost every civil administrative district a District War Executive Committee is responsible for waging war in that district. The committees are made up of a District Officer, Administrative Officer, Senior Police Officer for that district, Senior Military Commander, Home Guard officer, and others.


The emergency operational chain of command starts at the EOC and goes down through the Commanders Subcommittee, State War Executive Committees, and District War Executive Committees.

The services chain of command is used only to enable respective commanders to give orders to their own forces. For emergency operations, however, security forces are placed at the disposal of State and District War Executive Committees.

The police force is a federal organization commanded by a police commissioner. It consists of 10 contingents, with each contingent commanded

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FEDERATION OF MALAYA
OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND POLICY LINES



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by a chief police officer. Contingents are further divided into police circles; these are supervised by the next lower ranking police officers. The police circles are themselves divided into police districts and are directed by police of appropriate rank.

The police are divided into regular, temporary, and volunteer police. Police force duties are:

- a. Maintenance of law and order.
- b. Preserving public peace.
- c. Prevention and detection of crime and the capture of offenders.
- d. Protection of life and property.
- e. Collection of information relevant to these tasks and to internal security, and dissemination of this information to the Government.
- f. Paramilitary duties necessitated by the Emergency.

The primary role of the army is to seek out and destroy Communist terrorists in the jungle and on its fringes. The secondary role of the army is that of supporting the federal police in the populated areas by helping to enforce food denial measures, curfews, and so forth.

The Royal Air Force and Army Air Corps are available to support emergency operations. The RAF may operate independently or in direct cooperation with ground forces. The main RAF and Army Air Corps assignments are air reconnaissance, offensive air support, air supply to ground forces deep in the jungle, troop lift, casualty evacuation, and psychological warfare (aircraft fitted with special broadcasting apparatus and used for making voice broadcasts over parts of the jungle known to be occupied by Communist terrorists and for the dropping of leaflets).

The Royal Navy assists by carrying out antismuggling and anti-piracy around the coast of Malaya, amphibious landings, and bombardment of Communist terrorist areas.

The Home Guard has a part time force composed of all races. This force is more closely linked to the people and the Government in the fight against the Communist terrorists through: efforts to protect homes and villages and to deny the enemy access to such areas; cooperation with the security forces in passing information on Communist terrorist movements and agents, assuring that from the particular Home Guard's area no food reaches Communist terrorists, and active assistance to the security forces in offensive operations.

At the beginning of the emergency in Jun 48 the security forces in Malaya were charged with guarding the country's production centers, such as the rubber estates and tin mines. As the security forces grew and became better organized, tactics changed. In Jun 51, the Briggs Plan came into effect. It was aimed at bringing proper administrative control to a population which had never before been controlled. The main aspects of the plan were:

1. Rapid resettlement of squatters (Chinese refugees who many times provided Communist guerrillas with food, medicine, clothing, money, and

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shelter) under the surveillance of police and auxiliary police.

2. Regrouping local labor in mines and on estates.
3. The recruitment and training of special branch police personnel.
4. The army would provide a minimum number of troops throughout the country to support the police and would simultaneously provide a concentration of forces for clearing of priority areas.

The police and army were to operate in complete accord. To facilitate this joint operation, control was established at all levels, and there was a close integration of police and military intelligence.

The Plan also established the State War Executive Committee and the District War Executive Committee chain of command which has functioned ever since. This organizational setup has insured:

1. Complete integration of emergency effort.
2. Constant security force action in support of civil power.



CONSTANT PATROLLING BY HOME GUARD UNITS A SIGNIFICANT
FACTOR IN ELIMINATING COMMUNIST TERRORISM.

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The plan was essentially a thorough but long-term proposition. It envisaged a logical clearing of the country from south to north, leaving behind a strong police force and civil administration once an area or state had been cleared. It also aimed to isolate the MRLA from the rest of the rural population, thus enabling the people to feel safe to come forward with information and thereby depriving the MRLA of their means of support. This forced MRLA members into the open where they could better be dealt with by the security forces.

While the Briggs Plan did not achieve a clearing of the country from south to north, Communist terrorist organizations have been decisively eliminated in roughly 50% of the Federation's territory. Consequently, emergency regulations in these areas have been lifted.

Malayan officials explained to the people in the cleared areas that the responsibility was theirs for keeping the area "white" and that they could do this by refusing to cooperate with terrorists and by promptly reporting any Communist terrorist activity to the authorities.

In Dec 52, the Malayan Government decided that a forward policy would be adopted for the control of Malaya's aboriginal tribes. This would involve bringing protection and administration to the aborigines in their own areas. Resettlement of aborigines who live in the deep jungle would henceforth be avoided. This policy has been implemented by the following:

1. Expansion of the Federal Government Department of the Aborigines by the appointment of additional officers as protectors of aborigines in the states concerned and in recruitment of field teams to work in aboriginal areas.
2. Establishing a series of jungle forts in selected deep jungle areas.
3. The initiation of special operations to find parties of aborigines under Communist domination in the deep jungle and to bring them under Government protection.

The aims of the jungle forts were defined as follows:

To establish bases from which the federal police can give local protection to the aborigines and from which offensive operations can be mounted when the occasion arises.

To allow the aborigines in the selected areas to continue their normal way of life without risk of Communist terrorist domination and to permit an intelligence penetration of terrorist activity.

To improve the morale of the aborigines by having permanent security force garrisons in aboriginal areas and eventually by the recruitment of selected men to assist in local defense.

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To provide centers from which medical and trading facilities can be made available to the aborigines.

Pattern of Operations: Operations against the Communists in Malaya are categorized as:

Mopping-Up Operations: Operations to complete the destruction and to prevent revival of the terrorist organizations in "white" or selected areas. Communist organizations of the masses in such areas are usually disrupted, and the Communists terrorists rely for supplies on casual begging and extortion. Relaxation of emergency regulations prevents denial of food to Communists. Operations consist mainly of patrols to prevent contact between the terrorists and the population. The police and home guard make jungle patrols.

Framework Operations: These are the normal offensive operations by which a District War Executive Committee reduces its Communist terrorist organization when no state or federal priority is allotted. It may include any or all the parts of a major operation on a limited scale, i.e., gate checks, patrols to prevent contact between the terrorists and the population, ambushes, cordon and search operations, jungle patrols, central cooking or rationing in certain villages, and mass arrests. The essentials for success are resources, economy of effort, and a variety of methods.

State Priority Operations: Operations in which the State War Executive Committee decides to transfer security forces to exploit opportunities in specific areas, usually for limited periods. Examples are large-scale cordon operations, multiple ambushes, intensive patrols in areas where Communists terrorist groups are said to be, or strict food denial in certain areas for a short time. On occasions the State War Executive Committee may be provided with federal reinforcements, including air support for state priority operations.

Federal Priority Operations: Major food-denial operations are planned on a federal level, for which security force reinforcements are provided between target dates laid down by the director of operations. Priority is also given before and during the operation to the provision of civil and police officers, and for central cooking accommodations, roads, wiring, and so forth.

Deep Jungle Operations: Operations separate from the above are mounted to gain intelligence of Communist terrorist organization in the deep jungle, to deny the terrorists areas for rest and retraining, to protect and bring administration to aborigines, and to isolate the aborigines from Communist terrorists.

After eleven years of guerrilla warfare, Communist terrorists in Malaya apparently realize the futility of achieving their goal by force. Malayan Communists now are trying to infiltrate legitimate organizations and thereby overthrow the Government. The guerrillas have lost approximately 11,000 men, and their remaining paramilitary manpower, reduced to an estimated 700, has been driven deeper into the jungle; over half the number have been pushed into the rugged Thai-Malayan border area.

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The guerrillas have largely lost contact with the local populace that formerly was the principal source of recruitment and supplies; they thus have lost the capability for launching any organized offensive action. British Commonwealth and Malayan army and police elements in cooperation with Thai police continue to press the campaign to exterminate the last of the guerrillas; yet that all 700 will be captured or killed is unlikely. The Malayan guerrillas no longer are a danger to the Malayan Government, and no resurgence of terrorism is expected.

British and Colonial Anti-Guerrilla Tactics

British and colonial forces in Malaya have developed no new principles of jungle warfare since the 1948 State of Emergency. They did discover that tactics used against the Japanese in World War II, modified to suit a different enemy, were applicable to Malayan operations. While the Japanese were organized, ready and willing to fight, the enemy in Malaya is most unwilling to risk combat; instead, it uses intimidation, extortion, and murder to coerce the civil population into supplying food and money. It also employs hit-and-run tactics against the army, police patrols, and outposts to procure ammunition and equipment. To meet the guerrilla policy of avoiding combat with the security forces and to overcome the challenge of the Malayan jungle, the British High Command in Malaya developed a special training course in guerrilla warfare. Points emphasized were:

1. Rigid individual and collective discipline.
2. Endurance through physical fitness.
3. Expert marksmanship.
4. Automatic security precautions, including a proficiency in concealment and silent movement.
5. Practice in immediate action battle drills to promote instantaneous reaction to ambush.

In addition to these basic requisites, warfare in the jungle demands rigid observation of these other cardinal principles:

1. Survival in the jungle depends upon close observation; individuals must train themselves to look through, not at, the jungle.
2. Patrol commanders must be in a position to control their units at all times. They should not use guides as scouts, for the function of guides is primarily to advise patrol commanders.
3. Though sufficient distance must be maintained between individuals and groups to prevent ambushes, visual contact should be maintained so that silent signals can be passed between individuals and so that no part of the patrol becomes lost.

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CAMPAIGN IN THE JUNGLE

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Since the guerrillas would not stay to fight after successful raids or ambushes, British forces had to go into the jungle after them. Since Min Yuen intelligence precluded any success by patrols operating from static bases and since principal MRLA headquarters and larger supply caches are located deep within the jungle, British forces found the best chance for success came when patrols of platoon strength departed from static bases at night, maintained complete security, and penetrated the jungle for a distance of four to twenty miles to operate from a platoon base for a period of five to thirty days. The troops carried rations for the first two to four days. After that the platoon was supplied by air.

These bases should be situated near but not on water. They should be far from trails and villages, and should be near an open highground area for airdrop resupply. (See layout for a patrol base).

If enemy concentrations are found to be too large for the platoons to handle, the platoons will be supported by battalion reserve elements, held at the static base.

Clashes with Communist terrorists are sudden, short, and often so unexpected that the opportunity to inflict casualties is lost if a leader has to give orders at the time of the encounter. For this reason, immediate action drills were and are stressed so that the immediate reaction from a well trained patrol will be immediate offensive action. Four basic immediate action drills are taught on a section or patrol level.


1. The encircling attack: Intended for use only against a bandit ambush; the Malayan guerrilla tends to fight solely from fixed ambush positions.
2. The immediate ambush: Used when a bandit party is sighted but is unaware of the patrol's presence.
3. The immediate assault: Used in a situation when the patrol and the guerrillas simultaneously are aware of contact.
4. The assault on a bandit camp: Security measures employed by the guerrillas make immediate attack an absolute necessity once a bandit sentry is contacted. The patrol at once discards its equipment and moves on the double to positions according to instructions received through prior briefings and training.

The military forces in Malaya, supported by the federation police, are using the foregoing methods to eliminate guerrillas.


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MALAYA JUNGLE OPERATION TACTICS



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OPERATIONS IN INDOCHINA

At the outbreak of World War II in Europe, France was compelled to withdraw her best troops from Indochina for employment in the European theater. This action reduced the French fighting capability in Indochina and laid the colony open to vastly superior Japanese forces. On 10 Mar 45, Japanese troops and secret police imprisoned all French administrators and most Eurasians in Indochina. The colonial status of Indochina had ended. Elimination of the French force and its contacts severely reduced Allied intelligence, but into the gap stepped various nationalist and Communist groups that continued to fight the Japanese as guerrillas and passed information to OSS. When supplying these groups with weapons, radios, and other equipment, no distinction was made between their political ideologies or subordination to a recognized liberation movement of the various groups. Ho Chi Minh's guerrillas, who were better organized and trained, emerged as the dominant force. On 6 Aug 45, Ho's guerrillas became the Vietnamese Liberation Army. Two weeks later Ho claimed that the Viet Minh controlled all of Vietnam.

French forces arrived in Saigon in Oct 45 in sufficient strength to secure 70,000 square miles in Indochina and force Ho Chi Minh to dissolve his divisions and regiments in the south and return to guerrilla warfare. During the next several months the French and Viet Minh held negotiations. Throughout the period of negotiation France landed troops at Hanoi and established small garrisons, but incidents and fighting continued until 19 Dec 46, when the Viet Minh attacked French installations throughout Indochina and started the war between the French and the Viet Minh.

Basic objectives of the Communists in Indochina were to drive the French out of Indochina forever and to replace the French colonial government with a Communist-controlled "Democratic Republic of Vietnam." The war ended on 21 Jul 54 with a cease-fire negotiated at Geneva. The Geneva Agreements gave the Communists control of all of Vietnam north of the 17th parallel.

COMMUNIST FORCES

The Vietnamese People's Army was the final product of the original bands of Vietnamese guerrillas who entered Binh Ca Valley in North Vietnam late in 1944 under the command of a young Communist professor of history, Vo Nguyen Giap.

Organized officially in 1946, the Army of the Democratic Republic was, in the words of its leader Giap, first and foremost a political army. The Central Executive Committee controlled the Communist armed forces. A difference existed between the measures of control the committee had over regular and semiregular forces. The Ministry of Defense took control of the regular army while local executive committees became primarily responsible for use and maintenance of regional and militia forces.

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The Viet Minh forces were organized under a General Headquarters composed of three bureaus or directorates; General Staff, Political, and Rear Service.

The General Staff's field forces branch controlled the regular forces and units whose requirements took priority over those of all other branches. The Static Forces Branch provided the staff link between Area Commands and the Commander in Chief.

The Viet Minh envisaged three phases in the struggle: 1) The guerrilla phase, 2) an intermediate period, and 3) the general counteroffensive.

In the first phase, emphasis was placed almost completely on widespread guerrilla activity. Most of the rebel forces during this phase were engaged in establishing and consolidating guerrilla bases in the enemy's rear areas. Towards the end of the phase, selected units were grouped together into progressively larger concentrations. These units were formed into an offensive mass for maneuver, the Viet Minh Regular Army.

In the second phase, considered as beginning in 1948 by the Viet Minh, emphasis was shifted gradually from purely guerrilla activities to a war of maneuver. The offensive striking force made a series of sharp attacks designed to annihilate enemy forces rather than to capture territory. Meanwhile guerrilla forces continued to weaken the enemy by continuous activity in rear areas.

The third phase commenced in Dec 53 with the general counteroffensive of Communist forces under General Vo Nguyen Giap. This phase was undertaken when the Viet Minh believed that the military, political, and economic strength of the enemy had been sufficiently weakened through a wearing down process.

VIET MINH STRATEGY AND TACTICS


Viet Minh strategy and tactics were conditioned by geographic and political factors. Indochina's wealth and its population were concentrated in the fertile lowlands of the Red River delta in Tonkin and in the Mekong delta. Since the French occupied these important areas, the Viet Minh were restricted principally to the economically poor and sparsely populated mountainous regions of Indochina. The Red River delta was the primary target of Viet Minh strategy because the delta was a source of food and manpower and close to Communist supply bases in South China. The Communists concentrated 60% of their forces in that area. In addition, the Viet Minh by defeating the largest concentration of French forces in Indochina could eliminate a major barrier to the establishment of Communist control over the rest of the country.

Throughout the war the Viet Minh made great efforts to win the people to their side. Indoctrination of their armed forces stressed the inter-relationship of the army and the people. Communist political commissars

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MILITARY COMMAND LINES (VIET MINH)



at every echelon were responsible for constantly impressing upon the troops a respect for the rights and property of the people. Although the majority of the people attempted to remain neutral, they tended to drift towards support of the faction dominant in their particular area. Civilians in Viet Minh-controlled territory were subjected to continual anti-French propaganda. In areas occupied by the French, the regional and popular forces often engaged only in propaganda.

Other factors which aided the Viet Minh in gaining support of the people were:

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- 1) In newly captured areas the Viet Minh were lenient towards those who had collaborated with the French.
- 2) The French were unable to provide complete protection for the people within areas nominally under French military control.
- 3) The apparent endlessness of the struggle disrupted many aspects of native life.
- 4) The Bao Dai Vietnamese Government was pro-French, and it demonstrated an inability to deal effectively with Indochina's political and economic difficulties.
- 5) The potential for attrition was inherent in widespread guerrilla activities, and the Viet Minh tried to give the struggle the characteristics of a popular crusade.

ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT

As an instrument of Communist aggressive expansion in Indochina, the Viet Minh created an armed force consisting of three distinct but closely allied types of combat forces.

The Popular Troops: These forces were organized to function as intelligence agents, propagandists, informers, guards, terrorists, and laborers. They would also perform guerrilla functions within their capabilities, such as assassinations, minor ambushes, small-scale warfare, and sabotage of communications. The popular forces played a major role in the success of the Communist politico-military effort in Indochina, which culminated in Communist control over North Vietnam after the 1954 armistice. The popular forces had a three-fold purpose:

- 1) To create a large reserve of partly trained manpower for the regular army.
- 2) To provide a means of identifying the peasant masses with the Communist struggle.
- 3) To wage guerrilla warfare in enemy rear areas as a means to cause dissipation of military strength.


Although the status and evolution of the popular troops depends in large measure upon future political developments in North Vietnam, these quasi-military troops constitute a formidable force, one to be reckoned with in any future combat action.

Popular Force Tactics: The military efficiency of the popular forces varied widely from area to area, and was largely based on the ability, experience, and initiative of the cadre personnel. Generally, the degree of ideological indoctrination was more intense in North Vietnam; thus the degree of fanatic support was correspondingly greater.

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Elaborate preparations were made to resist mopping up or pacification in areas captured by the French Union forces. Villages located near important road or canal junctions or at critical terrain features were designated as combat villages. Fences of sharpened bamboo stakes were constructed around such sites.



TYPICAL FORTIFIED VILLAGE UNDER CONSTRUCTION; THE TYPE USUALLY CONSTRUCTED BY VIET MINH POPULAR TROOPS.

The villagers became expert in the construction of underground shelters that varied in shape and size. Shelters for protection against aerial bombs and napalm normally were undercut with a minimum of 20 inches of earth. Caches for materials, rice, and munitions were large, and the entrances ingeniously contrived to prevent easy discovery. Entrances favored by the Viet Minh guerrillas have been located under ashes of fireplaces, in buffalo stables, in pig pens, or in the midst of thorny hedges. Time permitting, tunnels were expanded to the point where the guerrillas could remain in hiding for days at a time, or if necessary slip through the

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tunnels to camouflaged exits on the outskirts of the village, and thus escape enemy forces surrounding their village.

In many cases tunneling was extended to link up with that of neighboring villages. In this way if escape from an encircling enemy was impossible by surface means, the underground routes were used. The result at times was an apparent dissolving of villagers into thin air, to the bafflement and frustration of the French Union Forces.

The Popular Forces proved ingenious and imaginative in the employment of ruses, mantraps, ambushes, and delaying actions between their combat villages and strongpoints. A favorite effective mantrap was the submerging of sharpened bamboo barbs below the surface of the mud along muddy trails. The barbs easily penetrated the rubber-soled sneakers worn by French troops.

THE REGIONAL FORCES

These troops were organized at the district and provincial level to train and support the popular troops; assist regular units; provide trained replacements for the regular army; and, within their zones of action, conduct guerrilla warfare on an extensive scale. The organization and equipment of the regional forces generally matched that of the regular army through battalion level.

The tactics of the regional and popular units were similar to those employed by Communist guerrillas in other countries, i.e., harassment, ambush, and sabotage. Viet Minh tactical doctrine teaches that to be effective, guerrilla action must be continuous and must be pursued wherever the enemy is found. The principles of guerrilla activity as revealed in captured Viet Minh documents emphasize secrecy, speed, deception, flexibility, surprise, mobility, initiative, persistency, planning, and numerical superiority over the enemy when attacking.


THE REGULAR ARMY

These forces constituted the tactical and strategic nucleus of the rebel forces charged with conducting offensive warfare. The regular army's organizational development and equipment decreased in direct proportion to its distance from supply bases in China. Operations were conducted on an individual level at Tonkin, regimental level in Annam, and battalion level in Cochin China. Viet Minh units in Tonkin were well supplied and attained a combat effectiveness which compared favorably with France's Vietnamese units. The regular units in Cochin China were weak in supporting weapons and ammunition.

The regular army employed a mixture of guerrilla and conventional tactics. In a divisional attack, one regiment would infiltrate enemy lines to ambush reinforcements, another would infiltrate to harass adjacent enemy strongpoints, while the third would make a frontal attack on the main objective. This combination of tactics was partly developed by the Viet Minh but based for the most part on the guerrilla experiences of the Chinese Communists as handed down by the Chinese Communist advisers to the Viet Minh. The campaign for Hoa Binh, which lasted from Nov 51

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Viet Minh Coordination of Forces in the Attack



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through Feb 52, illustrates tactics employing all three types of forces.

When the French seized Hoa Binh, a major Viet Minh communication center on 14 Nov 51, strong reactions from the rebels were expected. Although preparing for an autumn-winter offensive elsewhere, the Viet Minh high command quickly modified its plans and within two weeks began concentrating three regular infantry divisions and one artillery division in the Hoa Binh sector. The remaining two regular divisions in Tonkin were deployed northeast and southwest of the French perimeter.

The announced objective of the Viet Minh was to destroy the maximum number of French troops while driving them from Hoa Binh. To do this the Viet Minh had to create a threat elsewhere to divert powerful French mobile groups from the Hoa Binh sector. Normally regional and guerrilla forces within the French perimeter would have been entrusted with this mission. But these forces had been so weakened by a series of French clearing operations earlier in 1951 that they were no longer capable of posing a dangerous threat. To overcome this weakness, two remaining regular divisions were infiltrated into the delta to harass the French, to divert them from Hoa Binh, and to reconstitute the weakened regional and guerrilla forces. Viet Minh units in the rest of Indochina were ordered to carry out extensive activity to prevent the French from reinforcing Tonkin. Concurrently with these moves, the divisions in the Hoa Binh area began a series of frontal assaults on 10 Dec 51 against the French strongpoints. These troops conducted numerous ambushes of supply and reinforcement columns on the main French line of communication. These actions, in which the Viet Minh suffered losses almost 20 times those of the French, continued with diminishing strength through early Feb 52. In the meantime the French position in the delta had so deteriorated that only the intervention of strong mobile forces could prevent the Viet Minh from gaining complete control over large portions of the population. Accordingly, the French withdrew their forces from Hoa Binh on 24 Feb 52 to prepare for operations against the infiltrated regular Viet Minh units and the rejuvenated regional and popular forces. Despite heavy losses to themselves, the Viet Minh achieved their objective--the French were forced from Hoa Binh with heavy losses, and guerrilla activity in the Delta reached a new high.

In these operations, the Viet Minh demonstrated an unprecedented staying power, the result of improved logistic support from Communist China. Viet Minh operations showed improved tactical coordination with the grouping of several task forces from elements of several divisions which alternated between frontline duty, rest, and resupply in the rear.

Importance of Guerrilla Warfare: General Vo Nguyen Giap, who is one of the most important North Vietnamese commanders and who has been described by the French as a master of guerrilla warfare strategy, issued in Dec 51 a directive emphasizing the importance of guerrilla warfare.

Following are quotes from this directive:

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It has been noted that in certain cases, although our main forces have succeeded in annihilating only certain small posts, we manage, nevertheless, to seize extensive areas in the free zone. In other cases, in spite of several victories won by our troops not only did the free zone fail to expand, but on the contrary, it shrank.

In certain places, although our troops may have eliminated 70 to 80 watchtowers, we have not been successful in establishing bases in the region in question. In other cases, although our troops managed to destroy only five or six village posts and subdue a dozen or so other small posts, we were able to set up bases in relatively strong enemy country.

The aforementioned facts prove that in order to create, protect, and enlarge guerrilla activities, the following points must be given prime consideration.

- 1) We must win the people to our cause.
- 2) We must issue propaganda which will permit the merging of the people's action with military action.
- 3) We must attach great importance to the consolidation of our guerrilla bases with the local forces and to the cooperation of the latter with the regional troops and the main forces.

In a case where the enemy attacks our guerrilla bases with superior forces and temporarily overruns them, the consolidation of the people's bases and those of the communal guerrilla forces should remain our most important concern because by consolidating these bases we will maintain the people's support.

We must follow up our minor mopping-up operations or those made in more important raids. We must conserve our forces and use them only on those occasions which will be to our advantage, profiting from every opportunity to reinforce or expand our bases. We must intensify our guerrilla activity against all enemy operations whether large or small, and finally we must protect and enlarge our bases and positions. This is the immediate mission.

To succeed in this mission the most important consideration is that we attach proper importance to the cooperation of the people to our cause, to the consolidation of the people's bases and those of the communal guerrillas.

When this mission is accomplished we will have created a condition favorable to the development of guerrilla warfare, and we will have permitted regional formations to harass and exterminate enemy elements and to perfect their own degree of technical and tactical training.

We must never fail to remember this very important principle, not only in the occupied zone but also in the free zone.

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The Third Phase: General Giap, who had successfully avoided commitment of his main force, started his general offensive in Dec 53. Communist forces invaded central Laos, put northern Laos under attack, threatened Dien Bien Phu, and deeply penetrated the Red River Delta. On 7 May 54, Dien Bien Phu fell after a terrific battle. Hostilities ended on 21 Jul 54 after a cease-fire had been negotiated at Geneva. The Geneva Agreement placed all of Vietnam north of the 17th Parallel under Communist control.

ANTI-COMMUNIST FORCES

During the first six years of the war, the French forces developed tactics for combat against the Viet Minh that checked the Viet Minh threat but did not grasp the initiative from them. These tactics were influenced particularly by geographic factors, the nature of the enemy, and French strength and capabilities.

Organization: The French forces were organized on a territorial basis into four major regional commands. Each of these regions was divided into zones, the number varying with the geographic nature of the region. The zones were subdivided into sectors, which in turn usually were composed of several subsectors.

During the war there was no unified effective military control despite moves to accomplish this. Administration, command, and deployment of the French Army were hampered by complexity and division of authority at the governmental level. In addition, significant nonmilitary participation in control of operations added to the difficulties.

Political agreements were signed with Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in 1949. Under the agreements the prewar French Provinces of Tonkin and Annam and the prewar French colony of Cochinchina combined to form the new state of Vietnam. Cambodia and Laos had been semi-independent French protectorates. Upon ratification of agreements with these states by the French Government on 2 Feb 50, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos became associated states within the French Union. The military agreements providing for continued French operational responsibility were to remain in force until the military situation enabled the Associated States to maintain their own internal security.

During the war, the French Training Missions exercised all command and staff functions on behalf of the Associated States. These missions also functioned as the General Staffs of the country to which they were assigned. Each country had some degree of political and policy control through its Prime Minister, Defense Minister, or Minister of the Armed Forces. Vietnamese Chief of State Bao Dai, Cambodian King Norodom Sihanouk Varmen, and Laos King Sisavong Vong (now dead) were titular heads of their respective armies.

Activities of the French Training Missions were supervised by the Associated States and Logistic Sections of the French Permanent Secretariat

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of National Defense, which forms part of the staff of the French High Commissioner and Commander in Chief. French and Associated States military cooperation was further assured by permanent military committees composed of French and Associated States representatives.

The subsector generally comprised the defensive zone of a single battalion and sometimes was 150 square miles in size. Within the subsector, the battalion was deployed in a number of small posts, with the garrisons ranging from a platoon to a company in size. The infantry battalion usually was augmented by several national guard and militia companies, which either reinforced the garrisons of the posts occupied by the battalion or occupied separate posts and watchtowers in the subsector. In some instances individual friendly villages were provided with weapons and organized for their own defense. The total armed strength of some subsectors ran as high as 5,000 troops.

Mobile reserves or intervention units were maintained at most echelons. These units varied from platoon or company size in the subsector to a mobile division at regional level. The mobile division was a tactical command post established to coordinate the operations of two or more regimental combat teams. These intervention units were employed to relieve posts under attack or in offensive operations.

A vast network of static defense posts was organized in the areas under French control. These posts varied in size and construction depending on local conditions. In South Vietnam, where the Viet Minh forces were relatively weak, the posts were mostly of mud and brick with bamboo and barbed-wire barricades. In Tonkin, where Viet Minh units possessed bazookas and recoilless guns, there were many reinforced concrete strongpoints. Centrally located posts were allocated one or two artillery pieces of various types and calibers.

Little or no night patrolling was carried out by the garrisons of these static defense posts. The Viet Minh were free to move over the countryside during darkness. Posts under harassment or attack at night were supported by artillery fire from neighboring positions, if possible. Relief forces were dispatched at night if absolutely essential; but normally they were not sent out until after daybreak. Viet Minh assaults continuing after daybreak were subject to air counterattacks, and mobile relief forces attempted to encircle and destroy the Viet Minh forces.

Isolated posts in outlying areas were reinforced by paratroops unless an adjacent landing field permitted air landing of standard infantry units.

The motor, river, and particularly air mobility of the French forces enabled them to carry out extremely flexible defensive operations.

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Offensive Operations: Short-range offensive forays occasionally were made into Viet Minh-held areas as a means of forcing combat with Viet Minh regular forces under conditions favorable to the French-Vietnamese troops. In this type of action, several regimental combat teams, with armor and artillery support, would seize an important objective, such as an enemy communications center, and organize positions for all-around defense in anticipation of counterattacks. If the objective was sufficiently important, the Viet Minh would execute repeated frontal assaults on the defensive positions, thus suffering heavy losses. The operation at Hoa Binh is an example of this type of French operation.

Since the French were usually denied military initiative, such operations were infrequent.

Counter Guerrilla Operations: The objective of these operations was to expand the area of French-Vietnamese control or to destroy enemy units.

Operations designed to incorporate a new area into the defensive zone usually involved the encirclement of the area by local detachments, reinforced by mobile elements from a higher echelon, with subsequent sweeping of the area. Occasionally the area was cleared by establishing a single line of departure with all elements advancing simultaneously on a broad front between neutral boundaries. The mobile units remained in the area until the new posts were constructed and the garrisons installed.

The largest counter guerrilla operations were conducted in Tonkin, where elements equivalent to five regimental combat teams supported by medium artillery were employed in a single operation. Complete encirclement was almost always the goal but was seldom achieved. The use of naval river-craft to secure one or more of the flanks was common, and the employment of parachute elements—frequently as many as three battalions—to seal a flank or rear of the area was not unusual.

Once all units were in position, one of several methods were employed to reduce the pocket. The "hammer and anvil" method, a simultaneous inward movement of all elements, or partition of the area into several pockets, which were then reduced individually, are two maneuvers that were tried.

Frequently no enemy units were encountered during the sweeping of an area. This failure to make contact was occasionally caused by an incomplete encirclement but more often by the disappearance of the Viet Minh.



PATROL IN
THE JUNGLE

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Supposedly the groups were caught in the pocket. The difficulty of screening all individuals in the heavily populated zone of operations enabled the guerrillas to hide their weapons and mingle with local inhabitants. Many times the rebels escaped encirclement through prior knowledge of the operation. False intelligence planted by agents led the offensive forces astray, or the lack of accurate up-to-date intelligence resulted in encirclement of an area from which the guerrillas previously had moved.

The lack of adequate administrative, political, and economic follow-up to otherwise successful clearing operations often resulted in the subsequent infiltration by and re-establishment of Viet Minh forces in areas cleared. Attempts were made to execute the followup with mobile administrative groups organized by the French-Vietnam Government, but funds needed for organization and support of these groups were limited and the followup proved inadequate to the task of consolidation. Individual provinces were left with the responsibility of political and economic rehabilitation of pacified areas.

The Viet Minh were active in subverting the population outside their areas, and by threat of reprisal prevented the natives from cooperating with the French-Vietnamese forces. Although not actively hostile to the French-Vietnamese forces, the people seldom would reveal Viet Minh locations and plans. The attempt to overcome this by utilizing local troops, both regular and militia, had mixed results. The militia were not completely reliable as they were inclined to surrender without fighting when confronted by a superior enemy force or when under threat of reprisal against their families. For this reason they were not issued automatic or heavy weapons, further reducing their effectiveness.

Special antiguerrilla units were of relatively little importance during the war. Some small lightly armed commando units were used, and plans for their expansion were under way at the end of the war.

Psychological warfare likewise was not emphasized, apparently in the belief that the primary task was the defeat of enemy troops and that once the populace was free of Viet Minh intimidation and pressure, local Viet Minh organizations would collapse, and the people would rally to the French-Vietnamese side.

SUMMARY

Communist aggression in the Far East, particularly in Southeast Asia, is likely to follow in part Mao Tse-tung's principles of guerrilla warfare. Mao emphasized flexible yet carefully planned offensive action and close coordination of guerrillas with the regular army. He calls for strategically located base areas from which continued guerrilla offensives can emanate. Mao advises guerrilla leaders to learn to recognize the correct timing for offensives and withdrawals. He points up the need for a centralized command in planning broad strategy and the necessity for decentralized command in battle.

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Communist actions against the British and French in Southeast Asia were patterned along similar lines. The aims were to 1) wear down the enemy and build up Communist military and civil strength through guerrilla warfare from temporary bases; 2) expand continuously civil and military strength and intensify attacks on communications while occupying additional bases in smaller towns and villages; and 3) establish large permanent bases and convert guerrilla forces into regular units. MRLA's failure and Viet Minh's success may be traced to the degree and type of antiguerrilla operations opposing them during the war.

The British succeeded in antiguerrilla warfare where the French did not because the British recognized Communist tactics and created successful counteractions. The British effectively controlled the Malayan people and got support from them. The French did not accomplish this in Indochina. Maximum Communist strength in Malaya was estimated at between 25,000 and 30,000 against British combined forces that numbered about 250,000. Expansion of Communist control would have increased Communist total forces considerably and would have forced the British to augment their forces in proportion. Communist forces in Vietnam were estimated at about 300,000 while the total anti-Communist forces under the French numbered some 560,000 in mid-1954.

The British concentrated on training troops for jungle and irregular warfare; the French stuck mainly to World War II strategies. British strategy prevented the Communists from establishing permanent bases in the field. French tactics failed to accomplish this. The British exploited psychological warfare techniques and protected the people from Communist terrorism; the French failed to do this effectively in Indochina. The British seized the initiative from the Communists and went on to victory; the French did not.